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WHAT'S A CONSTITUTION AMONG FRIENDS?-
UNBALANCING ARTICLE III
CRAIG A. STERNt
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one su-
preme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish. TheJudges, both of the supreme and
inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behavior, and shall,
at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall
not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.
-The Constitution of the United States, Article III, Section 1
I. INTRODUCTION
Nine out of ten experts agree that a straightforward reading of
the first section of the third article of the United States Constitution
does not work.' Such a reading, it is said, would doom the District of
t Associate Professor, Regent University Law School; B.A. 1975, Yale University;
J.D. 1978, University of Virginia. The author thanks Mary Bunch, Ric Giuliano, Scott
Golden, Chris Kachouroff, Mike Schutt, John Tuskey, Eric Welsh, the American Cen-
ter for Law andJustice, and Regent University for their assistance and support.
I See, e.g., Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 582-83 (1985)
(observing that "[a]n absolute construction of Article III is not possible" in reviewing
congressional arbitration requirements unaccompanied by substantial review by an
Article IIIjudge); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S.
50, 93-94 (1982) (White, J., dissenting) (stating that questions regarding Article III
limits "on Congress'[s] ability to create adjudicative institutions.., can no longer be
answered by looking only to the constitutional text"); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION § 4.1, at 209-10 (2d ed. 1994) (arguing that it would be unrealistic, de-
spite the text of Article III, to declare every legislative court unconstitutional); George
D. Brown, Article 11 as a Fundamental Value-The Demise of Northern Pipeline and Its
Implications for Congressional Power, 49 OHIO ST. LJ. 55, 56 (1988) (analyzing the Su-
preme Court's retreat from a strict construction of Article III as possibly indicating a
lowered estimation "of the importance of [Airticle III tribunals"); Richard H. Fallon,
Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article II, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915,
916-17 (1988) (calling a "return to '[A]rticle III literalism' virtually unthinkable");
Judith Resnik, The Mythic Meaning of Article 1ff Courts, 56 U. COLO. L. REv. 581, 586
(1985) (noting that a literal reading of Article III is "defeated by an ultimately insur-
mountable response-reality"); Richard B. Saphire & Michael E. Solimine, Shoring up
Article I1. Legislative Court Doctrine in the Post CFTC v. Schor Era, 68 B.U. L. REV. 85, 126
(1988) (agreeing with the Supreme Court that "the resolution of disputes [about the
power of non-Article III tribunals] 'cannot turn on conclusory references to the Ian-
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Columbia courts, courts-martial, the welfare state, and more. Claim-
ing Chief Justice John Marshall as their vanguard, courts and com-
mentators have sought to escape the constitutional text by drafting
exceptions, striking balances, or proposing Pickwickian readings of
Section 1 of Article III.2
This Article suggests that Section 1 of Article III does work, and
that Chief Justice Marshall was the vanguard not for escaping the text,
but for reading it carefully. Section 1 does not threaten life as we
know it in the United States, nor does it threaten even most of the
developments thought to run afoul of the Section. Read carefully,
Section 1 does provide principled answers for some troublesome
questions.
A. Some Troublesome Questions
Article III, Section 1 of the United States Constitution vests the
federal judicial power in the federal courts and protects the tenure
and compensation of the judges of those courts. As the Framers of
the Constitution explained, an independent judiciary is a bulwark of
freedom5 Furthermore, the states were already chary of the power of
the federal courts,4 and would have been all the more so if the federal
guage of Article III'" (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S.
833, 847 (1986))); Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-
Powers Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 526 (1987)
(advocating a functional approach to separation-of-powers issues because formalism
"is simply incapable of describing the government we have"); Gordon G. Young, Public
Rights and the Federal Judicial Power: From Murray's Lessee Through Crowell to Schor, 35
BUFF. L. REV. 765, 865 (1986) (suggesting that the "constitutional 'symbol' [of Article
III] has been so changed that it bears no resemblance to its former self").
2 For a brief review of germane precedent as "a number of highly questionable
decisions impairing the protections afforded by [A]rticle III," see David P. Currie,
Bankruptcy Judges and the IndependentJudiciay, 16 CREIGHTON L. REv. 441,445 (1983).
3 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 301 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) ("The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the
same hands... may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny."); id. No. 78,
at 466 (Alexander Hamilton) ("[L]iberty can have nothing to fear from the judiciary
alone, but would have everything to fear from its union with either of the other de-
partments ... ."). Montesquieu had written that "there is no liberty, if the judiciary
power be not separated from the legislative and executive." 1 CHARLES DE
MoNTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 152 (Thomas Nugent trans., Colonial Press 1900)
(1748).
4 It is only by virtue of compromise among the Framers that lower federal courts
exist at all. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, § 1.1, at 3-4 (noting that after the proposal
to create lower courts was defeated, James Madison and James Wilson "suggested that
the Constitution mandate the existence of the Supreme Court, but leave it up to Con-
gress whether to create inferior federal courts").
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courts had been subservient to the President or Congress.5 Conse-
quently, one might conclude that any federal adjudication must be
within the exclusive province of judges with Section 1 security-that
is, security from a cut in pay and from removal during good behavior.
From the earliest days of the nation, however, some federal judg-
ing has been performed by those without Section I security. The First
Congress itself entrusted disputes regarding veterans' benefits, cus-
toms duties, and matters before courts-martial to determination by
6those who were themselves not judges at all. An 1828 opinion by
Chief Justice John .Marshall for the Court-his "vanguard" effort-
approved a court established by Congress for the United States terri-
tory of Florida presided over by judges without Section 1 security.
7
Likewise, in the landmark 1856 case of Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land
& Improvement Co., the Court held that Congress may authorize ex-
ecutive officers-notjudges in the least-to determine
matters, involving public rights, which may be presented in such form
that the judicial power is capable of acting on them, and which are sus-
ceptible of judicial determination, but which congress may or may not
bring within the cognizance of the courts of the United States, as it may
deem proper.8
Two years after Murray's Lessee, in Dynes v. Hoover, the Supreme Court
rebuffed a constitutional attack on courts-martial, the judges of which
have no Section 1 security.9
The twentieth century has seen the Court allow still more federal
adjudication by those without Section 1 security. In the seminal case
5 To support the claim that King George engaged in "repeated injuries and usur-
pations" to establish "an absolute tyranny" over the American colonies, the Declara-
tion of Independence charged that: "He has made judges dependent on his will
alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries."
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 9 (U.S. 1776); see also THE FEDERALIST No.
78, supra note 3, at 465-66 (assuring that the standard of good behavior for federal
judges would facilitate their independence from the legislative and executive
branches).
6 See Fallon, supra note 1, at 919-20 (noting that the First Congress delegated pub-
lic-rights disputes to nonjudicial resolution and authorized military tribunals).
SeeAmerican Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. 511, 1 Pet. 388 (1828).
8 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1856) (approving a levy on the land of a delinquent
customs officer, though the levy was pursuant to a warrant issued by the solicitor of the
treasury department, and not pursuant to thejudgment of a court).
9 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 78-79 (1858) (holding that congressional power to estab-
lish rules for trial and punishment of military offenses is "entirely independent" of Ar-
ticle III constraints, though the question of Section 1 security was not directly before
the Court).
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of Crowell v. Benson, the Court held that deputy commissioners with-
out Section 1 security could decide maritime disputes among private
parties ifjudges with this security had appropriate power to review the
decision.'0 Such decisions were the work of "adjuncts" to the judges
with Section 1 security, and not the work of full-fledged judges exer-
cising full-fledged judicial power." This "adjunct" theory proved use-
ful to later Courts that permitted federal magistrates to decide pre-
trial motions12 and preside over jury selection with the consent of the
parties. 3 After a brief formalist foray in Northern Pipeline Construction
Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,' 4 the Court rested upon a balancing test
that seems to give Congress substantial liberty to commit judicial
power to officers without Section I security. 5
10 285 U.S. 22, 48-54 (1932).
1 See id. at 54 (upholding the authority of the deputy commissioner and analogiz-
ing his function as factfinder to the familiar practice of appointing judicial "adjuncts"
to determine amounts of damages in civil cases).
12 See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 680-81 (1980).
13 See Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 940 (1991). For a review of cases re-
garding the constitutional limits of federal magistrate authority, see A Constitutional
Analysis of Magistrate Judge Authority, 150 F.R.D. 247 (1993) [hereinafter Constitutional
Analysis].
14 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982) (plurality opinion) (holding unconstitutional the grant
of power to bankruptcy courts to enter final judgment on a claim for damages for
breach of contract). The claim was brought by a petitioner for reorganization before
a bankruptcyjudge without Section 1 security. An opinion by Justice Brennan for the
plurality explained that precedent supported: (1) three narrow categories of legisla-
tive courts-territorial courts, courts-martial, and tribunals deciding public rights; and
(2) the use of "adjuncts" to Article III courts, especially to assist in deciding matters
regarding federal statutory rights when "the essential attributes of the judicial power
are retained in the Article III court." Id. at 76-78 (plurality opinion). The bankruptcy
judge fit none of these precedents. See id. at 87. For an analysis that anticipated Jus-
tice Brennan's Northern Pipeline analysis, see Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Article 1iI and
Judicial Independence: Why the New Bankruptcy Courts Are Unconstitutional 70 GEo. L.J.
297 (1981). TwoJustices concurred in thejudgment. A dissenting opinion byJustice
White presaged the later balancing test after documenting the apparent doctrinal dis-
array of the Court's efforts in this area. See Northern Pipelin 458 U.S. at 92-118 (White,
J., dissenting).
15 See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 857 (1986)
(upholding the power of judges without Section 1 security to adjudicate state-law
counterclaims arising out of the same transaction as the claim that the judge had
statutory authority to decide); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S.
568, 592 (1985) (holding that Congress has the authority to select binding arbitration
before an arbitrator without Section 1 security as a method of resolving disputes under
administrative law).
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Each of these "several exceptions to article III's apparently clear
command"16 presents a similar set of troublesome questions: Is the
Constitution to govern this area of the law? If so, how tojustify excep-
tions? What principles delimit exceptions once the constitutional text
is left behind?
17
B. The Next Best Constitution
Scholars and jurists have proposed diverse theories to justify and
shape exceptions to the text of Section 1. One theory is that necessity
and history have created a set of exceptions-a "neo-Darwinian"1 8
theory that fails to explain why the march of necessity and history
should halt with the present setL'9 Another is that Article III is satis-
fied by appropriate review before judges with Section 1 security.
This theory is difficult to square with the explicit provision of the Ar-
ticle that "Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts," 21 shall
have Section 1 security.2 The theory most popular these days, espe-
16 Saphire & Solimine, supra note 1, at 89; see also Deborah A. Geier, The Tax Court,
Article III, and the Proposal Advanced by the Federal Courts Study Committee: A Study in Ap-
plied Constitutional Theory, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 985, 1003 (1991) (describing territorial
courts, courts-martial, and public-rights cases as "historical exceptions" to the Consti-
tution).
17 Cf Paul M. Bator, The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and Administrative
Courts UnderArticle111, 65 IND. L.J. 233, 246 (1990) ("Indeed, it is my own sense that
this is a field in which any exception destroys the underlying rule.").
Is Id. at 233.
19 And query: Just how necessitous is the necessity behind the exceptions? See eg.,
Frank H. Easterbrook, "Success" and the Judicial Power, 65 IND. L.J. 277, 278-80 (1990)
(questioning the common reasons given for why a system involving life-tenured ad-
ministrative lawjudges is undesirable).
20 See Bator, supra note 17, at 266-70 (arguing that Article III is satisfied so long as
judges with Section 1 security retain "ultimate judicial control"); Fallon, supra note 1,
at 933 (opining that a "sufficiently searching review of a legislative court's or adminis-
trative agency's decisions by a constitutional court will always satisfy the requirements
of Article III"); Saphire & Solimine, supra note 1, at 135-52 (arguing that the availabil-
ity and scope of review by an Article III court should be considered in assessing the
authority ofjudges without Section 1 security).
21 U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1 (emphasis added).
See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 86
n.39 (1982) (plurality opinion) (stating that "the constitutional requirements for the
exercise of the judicial power must be met at all stages of adjudication," notjust at the
appellate level); see also Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 674-76 (1978)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that state-court factual determinations regarding
claims within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts should not be given col-
lateral estoppel effect in subsequent federal-court actions); England v. Louisiana State
Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 375 U.S. 411, 415-17 (1964) (Brennan, J.) (emphasizing the sig-
nificance of conducting trial in federal court, notwithstanding the availability of ap-
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cially with the Court,23 is balancing. In one pan of the balance is the
cost to Article III values, sometimes bifurcated into (1) a decrease in
the protection of litigants from bias (a protection they are free to
waive); and (2) a decrease in the protection of courts from breaches
of the separation of powers. In the other pan is the advancement of
Article I values, specifically that Congress exercise power as necessary
to legislate effectively toward constitutional ends.24 If the benefits of
peal from other fora to the Supreme Court); cf. David A. Strauss, Article 11I Courts and
the Constitutional Structure 65 IND. L.J. 307, 309-10 (1990) (arguing that the core pur-
pose of Section 1 security is the guarantee of the impartial decision of specific cases,
not merelyjudicial review of issues of law).
23 See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 855 (1986)
(upholding CFTC's delegated authority to adjudicate counterclaims in the situation
where "separation of powers concerns are diminished"); Thomas v. Union Carbide
Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 592-94 (1985) ("Congress ... may create a seemingly
'private' right that is so closely integrated into a public regulatory scheme as to be a
matter appropriate for agency resolution with limited involvement by the Article III
judiciary. To hold otherwise would be to erect a rigid and formalistic restraint .... ).
24 This balancing is necessarily skewed: "[Ain immediately recognizable, concrete
interest is balanced against an interest wholly prophylactic in nature, and therefore
one whose benefits will never be immediately recognizable." Martin H. Redish, Legis-
lative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and the Northern Pipeline Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J.
197, 221-22. Justice Brennan echoed this sentiment in his Schordissent. See478 U.S. at
863 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court pits an interest the benefits of which are
immediate, concrete, and easily understood against one, the benefits of which are al-
most entirely prophylactic, and thus often seem remote and not worth the cost in any
single case."). Professor Paul Bator, while granting Congress great discretion in estab-
lishing Article I adjudication, nevertheless found a balancing test unprincipled. See
Bator, supra note 17, at 257-58 ("'Balancing'... seems to me to paper over the reali-
ties; it serves to provide a rather illusory band-aid for the wounds inflicted on the Sim-
ple Model."). Also, Professor Daniel Meltzer warned of the incremental erosion of
Article III by measures that individually appear safe. See Daniel J. Meltzer, Legislative
Courts, Legislative Power, and the Constitution, 65 IND. LJ. 291, 292 (1990) ("I suspect that
judicial independence is less likely to be subverted by 'wholesale transfers ofjurisdic-
tion' or by a Congress with destructive intent than by the accretion of measures, each
of which creates a significantjurisdiction in a non-article III tribunal." (quoting Bator,
supra note 17, at 258)). The example given by the Schor Court of what might tip the
balance to an unconstitutional extreme offers no comfort:
[I]f Congress created a phalanx of non-Article III tribunals equipped to han-
dle the entire business of the Article III courts without any Article III supervi-
sion or control and without evidence of valid and specific legislative necessi-
ties, the fact that the parties had the election to proceed in their forum of
choice would [not] necessarily save the scheme from constitutional attack.
478 U.S. at 855. Saphire and Solimine find the implications of this passage
"potentially significant, if not staggering." Saphire & Solimine, supra note 1, at 121.
Apparently, the federal bench is not willing to protect its own jurisdiction from
diminution. As long as the "important" cases remain before federal judges, they seem
willing to lose the common-law contract claim (Schor) and the run-of-the-mill federal
statutory commercial claim (Thomas). In fact, they may perceive the mass of such
"unimportant" claims as crowding out important cases. In such circumstances, the
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the advancement of Article I values outweigh the costs to Article III
values, then the "exception" to Article III passes constitutional muster
before the Court. This balancing theory, at least, makes explicit the
notion that necessity fuels the engine of exceptions to the constitu-
tional text.25
One would think that embracing this balancing theory would
doom the exceptions. The text of the Constitution already has bal-
anced Article III values against Article I values. Indeed, that balance
is the very object of the text. The text invites a rebalancing only in
Article V, concerning constitutional amendment. Furthermore, only
a centralizing, nationalistic pragmatism argues that Article I necessi-
tates departure from Article III. Why not argue that Article III neces-
sitates a departure from Article I?" Regardless, both arguments err in
positing a defect in the text. Would not faithfulness to the Constitu-
tion counsel, rather, that Article I values, like Article III values, are to
be pursued to the extent and in the manner prescribed by the Consti-
tution itself? The text itself indicates that in crafting Article III, the
Framers limited the powers of Congress.27 How, then, is it possible
checks and balances of the Constitution will fail, see THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James
Madison), because the personal ambitions ofjudges will have diverged from those of
their office, presuming, of course, that the office does embrace deciding such
"unimportant" claims. What's a Constitution among friends?
25 Even before Thomas and Schor, a perceptive student had noted:
Article III's tenure and salary provisions were meant to insulate the adjudica-
tory process from the influence of the political branches. Yet the principle of
judicial independence has gradually been limited by the Court in response to
the evolving necessities of the modem administrative state. Although this
evolution may be unavoidable and beneficial, the Court's decisions regarding
legislative courts and adjuncts have gone too long without being anchored in
a principled interpretation of article III.
Note, Federal Magistrates and the Principles of Article 1I, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1947, 1963
(1984).
26 CfJOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST 96 (MerrutY. Hughes ed., Odyssey Press 1962)
(1674) ("So spake the Fiend, and with necessity,/The Tyrant's plea, excus'd his devil-
ish deeds.").
27 As the staff of the Senate Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery
noted in 1967:
The argument that Congress' [s] power to legislate generally for [federal] en-
claves includes the power to provide for the enforcement of such legislation
by non-Article III officials is, at least, suspect. Congress has exclusive jurisdic-
tion over the coinage of money and the punishment of counterfeiters, U.S.
CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 5, 6; id. art. I, §10, but these provisions do not give it
power to provide for the trial of counterfeiters without regard to the limita-
tions of Article III. Congress has the power to promote the "Progress of Sci-
ence and useful Arts" by enacting appropriate patent and copyright laws, U.S.
CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8, but that provision does not mean then Congress can
insulate all cases and controversies involving the patent and copyright laws
1998] 9
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that the Constitution requires that a constitutional "value" exceed its
constitutional bounds?
C. A Constitutional Trial
Until it embraced a balancing test in Thomas v. Union Carbide Agri-
cultural Products Co.2 and Commodity Futures Trading Commission v.
Schor,2 the Supreme Court never passed off the "exceptions" to Sec-
tion 1 as exceptions. One must wonder whether the likes of John
Marshall would have carved out an exception to Section 1 security so
as to enhance congressional prerogatives at the expense of the federal
judiciary.30 Rather, as we shall see, the classic "exceptions" opinions
read as expositions of Section 1, not evasions.
This Article aspires to follow in the tradition of those classic opin-
ions. It suggests that Section 1 invites careful reading, not evasion by
exceptions spawned by "[t]he felt necessities of the time." 3 1 It as-
sumes that the text of the Constitution is constitutional law.32 Treated
from the requirements of Article III, and have them resolved in special pro-
ceedings that do not involve the judicial power of the United States. Con-
gress has the power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, U.S.
CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and punish certain acts that jeopardize such com-
merce, U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 18, but this does not mean that Congress
can provide that all violations of penal laws passed pursuant to the commerce
power must be prosecuted in a special "commerce court" that is insulated
from the provisions of Article III. The mere fact that a particular law finds its
constitutional roots in an Article I power, such as the authority to regulate
Federal enclaves, does not give it any special status when viewed against the
requirements that Article III sets down for the trial of all "cases and contro-
versies."
Federal Magistrates Act, 1967: Hearings on S. 945 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in
Judicial Mach. of the Senate Comm. on theJudiciary, 90th Cong. 250 (1967) (memorandum
prepared by the staff of the Subcommittee on Improvements in judicial Machinery).
473 U.S. 568, 582-86 (1985).
478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986) (balancing, among other factors, "the concerns that
drove Congress to depart from the requirements of Article III" (emphasis added)).
so One must wonder further about Marshall if the carving out of exceptions to Sec-
tion 1 security was to enhance the prerogatives of the Jacksonian Congress. See AVERY
CRAVEN & WALTERJOHNSON, THE UNITED STATES: EXPERIMENT IN DEMOcRACY 299
(1947) (noting the rift between Marshall on the one hand, andJackson and the House
of Representatives on the other, regarding Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515
(1832): "John Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it.").
31 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Boston, Little, Brown, and
Co. 1881).
52 For a similar approach regarding interpretations of the Eleventh Amendment,
see Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 1342 (1989). Professor Marshall challenges originalist interpreters of the Elev-
enth Amendment "who claim tojustify their approach as based on original intent but,
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with respect, Section 1 comprises a principled, workable algorithm for
determining what matters must come before judges with Section 1 se-
curity. The algorithm needs no exceptions, and brooks none. Still
less does it need supplanting with unprincipled ipse dixit-balancing."
The rest of this Article comprises three major Parts, each of which
examines a different component of the text of Section 1. Part II ex-
amines "the judicial Power." Distinguishing between the judicial and
the executive powers resolves two important problems thought to re-
quire exceptions to the text: problems raised by courts-martial and
the public-rights doctrine. Part III examines the judicial power "of
the United States." A proper appreciation of this language resolves
another important problem, that raised by territorial courts. Part
IV-resolving yet a fourth problem (that of the "adjunct" theory)-
examines the vesting of federal judicial power in "Courts," the
"Judges" of which have Section 1 security. Each of the three compo-
nents embraces a principle for our Constitution. Each also marks a
practical limit to the requirement of Section 1 security. Adhering to
the text of Article III should lend coherence to a jurisprudence in
disarray, 4 a coherence born of the Constitution itself and the princi-
ples that animate it.
at the same time, ignore the best possible evidence of that intent-the precise and de-
terminate words of the amendment." IL- at 1345. Placing the text in its historical and
original legal context, Marshall "show[s] that there are... explanations for why the
amendment reads as it does, and that there is, therefore, no justification for discard-
ing the plain meaning of the text." Ia- at 1371. Similarly, this Article embraces a tex-
tualism that strives to understand the constitutional text in its historical and original
legal context.
See Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 895-98 (1988)
(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (criticizing balancing analyses); Antonin Scalia,
The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1186 (1989) (arguing that
"when balancing is the mode of analysis, not much general guidance may be drawn
from the opinion").
ChiefJustice Rehnquist's concurring opinion in Northern Pipeline expressed his
doubt as to "whether [the precedents in this area] in fact support a general proposi-
tion and three tidy exceptions, as the [Brennan plurality opinion had held], or
whether instead they are but landmarks on ajudicial 'darkling plain' where ignorant
armies have clashed by night, as Justice White apparently believes them to be [as de-
scribed in his dissenting opinion advocating balancing]." Northern Pipeline Constr.
Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 91 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in
judgment). Typical seems to be the view that "O]udicial analysis in this area.., is
veiled by layer upon layer of dubiety," Geier, supra note 16, at 1033, and that the
Court's efforts in Northern Pipeline, Thomas, and Schor left "muddy waters" "even mud-
dier," id. at 1002.
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II. COURTS-MARTIAL, PUBLIC RIGHTS, AND THEJUDICIAL POWER
A. Courts-Martial and "theJudicial Power"
From the earliest days, courts-martial have not employed judges
with Section 1 security. Almost as old as this practice is the doctrine
that agencies of the federal government may decide matters of public
rights without the ministrations ofjudges with Section 1 security. Al-
though the Supreme Court has cast these two phenomena as historic
exceptions to the terms of Article III,ss they actually illustrate the tex-
tual limits of that Article. Article III purports to describe and vest
only "the judicial Power."16 Conducting courts-martial and deciding
matters of public rights are matters of executive, not judicial, power.
Consequently, Article III and its Section 1 security have nothing to do
with them.
It is commonly remarked that the judicial power involves applying
law to facts, and so it does. But this description is incomplete. My
thirteen-year-old son had better apply law to facts when he rides his
bicycle, yet that is not to ask him to exercise the judicial power. The
late Professor Paul Bator noted that the executive must often apply
law to facts. 37 What makes applying law to facts an exercise of the ju-
dicial power is the nature and purpose of that application. If it is
done by a boy to guide his bike, it is not an exercise of the judicial
power. If it is done by an executive agency to guide its actions, it is
not an exercise of the judicial power.3s If, however, it is done for op-
35 See, e.g., Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 63-70, 70 (plurality opinion) (identifying
"three situations [courts-martial, cases dealing with "public rights," and territorial
courts] in which Article III does not bar the creation of legislative courts" and noting
that "[iln each of these situations, the Court has recognized certain exceptional pow-
ers bestowed upon Congress by the Constitution or by historical consensus").
36 U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1 (emphasis added).
37 See Bator, supra note 17, at 264 ("Every time an official of the executive branch,
in determining how faithfully to execute the laws, goes through the process of finding
facts and determining the meaning and application of the relevant law, he is doing
something which functionally is akin to the exercise ofjudicial power."). Bator, how-
ever, used this observation to pan the very notion that the judicial power is essentially
distinct from executive power, and should be vested in Article III courts alone. See id.
at 265 ("[I] t is philosophically muddled and institutionally chimerical to try to create a
rigid logical scheme to define what 'is' the exercise of the federal judicial power and
then insist[] that the article III courts retain a monopoly over whatever 'it' is.").
38 This is no anomaly. Neither is it a breach of the separation of powers. Presi-
dents issue executive orders, the Houses of Congress command Sergeants-at-Arms and
Doorkeepers, federal courts promulgate local rules, and so on. What places these
powers safely within a "noncorresponding" branch is the context and purpose of the
power. Executive orders direct officers of the executive branch as to the will of the
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posing parties by a neutral with the purpose of authoritatively pro-
nouncing the law in officially resolving a dispute between these op-
ponents, then it is an exercise of the judicial power.
The concept of "the judicial Power" was well known to the Fram-
ers. The common law largely would have shaped the concept. 9 And
the common-law concept of the judicial power depended upon pro-
cedure, procedure that emphasized the role of parties-plaintiffs
bringing actions and defendants answering them.4 ' To the same ef-
fect would have been the familiar locus classicus from Holy Writ,
Moses' description to Jethro, his father-in-law, of his own role as
judge: "When they have a matter, they come unto me; and I judge
between one and another, and I do make them know the statutes of
God, and his laws."41 The very word "judicial" derives ultimately from
Chief Executive whom they assist. The Legislative Houses command their own officers
in order to legislate more efficiently. Federal courts adopt rules to promote the just
resolution of litigation before them. See, e.g., Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74,
84-85 (1970) ("Many courts-including federal courts-have informal, unpublished
rules .... These are reasonable, proper and necessary rules'); Textile Mills Sec. Corp.
v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326, 332 (1941) (noting the functions of the Supreme
Court, other than those of an appellate tribunal, as provided for in the Judicial Code,
include "prescribing the form of writs and other process and the form and style of its
seal; the making of rules and regulations; the appointment of a clerk... ; and the fix-
ing of the 'times' when court shall be held" (citations omitted)); Wayman v. Southard,
23 U.S. 1, 42, 10 Wheat. 1, 94-96 (1825) ("[C]ongress has expressly enabled the courts
to regulate their practice by other laws .... [C]ongress may certainly delegate to oth-
ers, powers which the legislature may rightfully exercise itself."). The test of appropri-
ate power is not an arid exercise in formalism. Illumined by the constitutional text,
the common law, and long-standing practice, the separation of powers distributes the
three broad functions of the federal government. It does not banish from each
branch operations appropriate and subservient to the function assigned it. See Harold
J. Krent, Separating the Strands in Separation of Powers Controversies, 74 VA. L. REV. 1253,
1308 (1988) ("U]judges ordinarily perform... 'housekeeping' duties in their own in-
terests, not at the behest of other branches. There is little dispute that the judiciary
may discharge the administrative authority necessary to conduct its own business with-
out running afoul of the separation of powers doctrine.").
39 "The language of the Constitution cannot be interpreted safely except by refer-
ence to the common law and to British institutions as they were when the instrument
was framed and adopted." Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 108-09 (1925); see also U.S.
v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 654-55 (1898).
40 See HARoLDJ. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION 451-53 (1983) (discussing the de-
velopment and importance of the system of writs); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 49-51, 126-29 (1973) (discussing the influence of common
law, including its reliance on parties, in the development of the early American law of
civil procedure); THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON
LAW 353-418 (1956) (surveying the development of the procedure of the common
law).
41 Exodus 18:16 (KingJames). Blackstone drew upon a related passage from chap-
ter 18 of Exodus in discussing the structure of the English judicial system. See 3
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jus dicere, Latin for "to speak the law." The judicial power is an official
"speaking of the law" to other parties so as to resolve a dispute be-
tween them.42
The Supreme Court had occasion in 1851 to consider the mean-
ing of "the judicial Power."43 Congress had authorized judges to re-
ceive and adjust Spanish claims against the United States for its op-
erations in Florida. The judges reported to the Secretary of the
Treasury, who would pay if "satisfied" that the award was "just and eq-
uitable. " 44 The Court decided that it had no jurisdiction to hear an
appeal from the judge's award because the award was not the product
of ajudicial function:
For there is to be no suit; no parties in the legal acceptance of the term,
are to be made-no process to issue; and no one is authorized to appear
on behalf of the United States, or to summon witnesses in the case. The
proceeding is altogether ex parte; and all that the judge is required to
do, is to receive the claim when the party presents it, and to adjust it
upon such evidence as he may have before him, or be able himself to
obtain. 45
Though "judicial in their nature" and entailing "judgment and
discretion," the power of the judge to make an award and the power
of the Secretary to pay it were "notjudicial in either case, in the sense
in which judicial power is granted by the Constitution to the courts of
the United States." 46 Therefore, appeal did not lie to the Supreme
Court. This case illustrates that the "judicial nature" of decisionmak-
ing does not suffice to render it an exercise of the judicial power.
WILuAM BLAcESTONE, COMMENTARIES "31 ("[Wie read of Moses; that, finding the sole
administration ofjustice too heavy for him, he 'chose able men out of all Israel, such
as feared God, men of truth ... and made them head over the people, rulers of thou-
sands, rulers of hundreds, rulers of fifties, and rulers of tens: and they judged the
people at all seasons; the hard causes they brought unto Moses, but every small matter
theyjudged themselves.'" (quoting Exodus 18:21-22)); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
849 (6th ed. 1990) ("Courts [as vested with judicial power] have general powers to de-
cide and pronounce ajudgment and carry it into effect between two persons and par-
ties who bring a case before it for decision .... "); 1 MONTESQUIEU, supra note3, at 151
("By the Ojudiciary power, the prince or magistrate] punishes criminals, or determines
the disputes that arise between individuals.").
42 The notion of the judicial power as a power to be exercised by one not party to
the dispute finds expression in the maxim, in prcpfia causa nemojudex-no one is to be
judge in his own case.
43 United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. 39, 13 How. 43 (1851).
44 Id. at 45, 13 How. at 49.
4 Id. at 46, 13 How. at 50.
46 Id. at 48, 13 How. at 53
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The context and purpose of the decision also bear upon the question.
Without a suit, without "parties," the judicial power is absent.
47
Likewise, upon the force of this reasoning, courts-martial do not
exercise the judicial power. Instead, they exercise the executive
power, the power of a military command to discipline its troops.48
49Dynes v. Hoover explained that the Constitution invests Congress with
power to establish the military and, along with it, its customary usages
and institutions.' ° Courts-martial are part of the chain of command,
an effective means of administering discipline that otherwise might
be meted out by the commander himself.51 "In essence, these tribu-
nals are simply executive tribunals whose personnel are in the execu-
tive chain of command."52 This fact explains why courts-martial are so
different from civilian courts and why only military personnel are sub-
53ject to their jurisdiction. As the Court stated in Dynes, the congres-
47 But see Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568, 577 (1926) (stating that natu-
ralization in the district courts is within the judicial power, being "instituted
and.., conducted throughout according to the regular course of judicial proce-
dure.").
See, e.g., O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 265 (1969) ("A court-martial is not
yet an independent instrument ofjustice but remains to a significant degree a special-
ized part of the overall mechanism by which military discipline is preserved." (footnote
omitted)), overruled on other grounds by Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987);
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 36 (1957) (describing military courts as "executive tribu-
nals"); United States ex reL Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17, 22, 29, 41-43 (1955)
(distinguishing military courts from civilian courts); David A. Schlueter, The Court-
Martial: An Historical Survey, 87 MIL. L. REv. 129, 154-55 (1980) ("[T] he court-martial,
at least to [1874], was considered primarily as a function or instrument of the execu-
tive department to be used in maintaining discipline in the armed forces. It was there-
fore not a 'court', as that term is normally used.").
49 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1857) (upholding the authority of a court-martial).
50 The Dynes Court noted that the sentences of many courts-martial could not be
executed unless confirmed by the President or Secretary of the Navy, "who ordered
the court." Id. at 81. The officer "ordering the court... is made by the law the arbiter
of the legality and propriety of the court's sentence." Id. Similarly, the present Uni-
form Code of Military Justice grants to convening officials authority "to modify the
findings and sentence of a court-martial [as] a matter of command prerogative involv-
ing the sole discretion of the convening [official]." 10 U.S.C. § 860(c) (1) (1994).
51I See Easterbrook, supra note 19, at 281 (noting that "[m] ilitary decisions.., stem
from a tradition of summary punishment within the chain of command").
52 Reid, 354 U.S. at 36.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14 (providing that Congress may"make Rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces," presumably including the
authorization of courts-martial (emphasis added)); see Reid, 354 U.S. at 34-37 (holding
that an overseas civilian dependent of a serviceman, though residing on base, is be-
yond the jurisdiction of a court-martial trying a capital charge in time of peace); Toth,
350 U.S. at 22-23 (holding that a discharged veteran is beyond the jurisdiction of a
court-martial); ExparteMilligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 130 (1866) (holding that a citizen
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sional power to establish courts-martial "is given without any connec-
tion between it and the 3d article of the Constitution defining the ju-
dicial Power of the United States; indeed .... the two powers are en-
tirely independent of each other."5
Again, the claim is not that courts-martial somehow are not
courts, or that courts-martial somehow decide cases while avoiding
"judicial" behavior. Long ago, the Supreme Court, in the context of a
military tribunal, recognized that "[e]very trial involves the exercise
of judicial power."s5 (In the next sentence, however, the Court was
quick to note that "[c]ertainly no part of the judicial power of the
country was conferred on" the tribunal in the case.)56 Likewise, the
Court has ruled that a nineteenth-century statute requires the Presi-
dent to act judicially when approving as commander-in-chief the sen-
tence of a court-martial. 5 7 These precedents, like the very use of the
terms "court" and 'judge" in military discipline, cast courts-martial
and other authorities in judicial roles.58 No doubt, military discipline
with no connection to the military or to a rebellious state is beyond the jurisdiction of
a "military commission").
61 U.S. (20 How.) at 79; see also Currie, supra note 2, at 449 (noting the
"historically special and separate position of militaryjustice").
55 Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 121.
Id. (emphasis added).
57 See Runkle v. United States, 122 U.S. 543, 557 (1887) ("Here... the action re-
quired of the [P] resident is judicial in its character, not administrative.").
58 And yet, Colonel William Winthrop, "the Blackstone of American military law"
and chief exponent of "the classical theory of military law," Walter T. Cox, III, The
Army, the Courts, and the Constitution: The Evolution ofMilita2yJustic4 118 MIL. L. REV. 1,
9 (1987), explained that "strictly, a court-martial is not a court in the full sense of the
term, or as the same is understood in the civil phraseology." WILLIAM WINTHROP,
MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 49 (2d rev. ed. 1920); see also GARRARD GLENN & A.
ARTHUR SCHILLER, THE ARMY AND THE LAW 51-52 (rev. ed. 1943) (noting that
"[s]trictly speaking, a court-martial is not a court in the full sense of the term"). At the
same time, however, Winthrop noted that the court-martial, "so far as it is a court at
all, and within its field of action, [is] as fully a court of law and justice as is any civil tri-
bunal." WINTHROP, supra, at 54. The court-martial is bound by law, and must act
without partiality and in accordance with justice. See id. A later authority would ex-
plain:
In the development of discipline, correction of individuals is indispensable; in
correction, fairness or justice is indispensable. Thus, it is a mistake to talk of
balancing discipline andjustice-the two are inseparable. An unfair or unjust
correction never promotes the development of discipline. As stated in our
preliminary report, "All correction must be fair; both officers and soldiers
must believe that it is fair."
... It is not proper to say that a military court-martial has a dual function
as an instrument of discipline and as an instrument ofjustice. It is an instru-
ment ofjustice and in fulfilling this function it will promote discipline.
UNBALANCING ARTICLE II1
entails the application of law to facts, making use of the judicial
method. Nevertheless, the context of that method is not that of "the
judicial Power" as that term is used in Article III. It is not to resolve a
dispute, but rather to arrive at an appropriate discipline for the
command to impose, albeit a discipline that is according to law and
justice.
A recent case dealing with the legal status of military judges gave
the Supreme Court opportunity to reaffirm the difference between
the power of courts-martial and "the judicial Power" of Article I1.59
Two Marines received convictions and sentences from courts-martial.
They attacked these decisions on two theories: First, that the Ap-
pointments Clause of the Constitution required an appointment of
military judges separate from their appointment as military officers;
and second, that the Due Process Clause required fixed terms for
military judges. The Court rejected both theories. It rejected the
first, in part, because military judges had already been appointed as
military officers. Beyond this, "all military officers, consistent with a
long tradition, play a role in the operation of the military justice sys-
tem."6° Officers impose discipline, serve as members of courts-martial
(including some courts-martial that have no judge whatsoever), and
may modify the sentences of courts-martial. "By the same token, the
position of military judge is less distinct from other military positions
than the office of full-time civilian judge is from other offices in civil-
ian society."6' The military judge is more an officer detailed for a par-
ticular special duty than an officer whose standing sets him apart as
one requiring a separate appointment.
The second theory of the petitioners, based upon the Due Process
Clause, fell before two main objections. The petitioners conceded
that military judges, as Article I judges, need not receive the good-
behavior tenure secured by Article III. The petitioners did argue,
however, that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment re-
quired that military judges receive some fixed term of office. The
COMMITTEE ON THE UNIF. CODE OF MILITARYJUSTICE GOOD ORDER AND DISCIPLINE IN
THE AIrMY, REPORT TO HONORABLE WILBER M. BRUCKER, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY 11-12
(1960). That effective instruments of military discipline must apply lawjustly and even
adopt the techniques of courts does not render them instruments of the judicial
power. They remain instruments of the executive. Does any other executive official
work a translation into the judicial branch by applying law justly to controversial facts
carefully adduced?
59 SeeWeiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163 (1994).
6D Id at 175.
61 id
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Court disagreed. The Court first noted that the Anglo-American tra-
dition of military justice had never granted military judges a fixed
term of office. Courts-martial were long presided over by officers as
part of their general duties. "Courts-martial ... have been conducted
in this country for over 200 years without the presence of a tenured
judge, and for over 150 years without the presence of any judge at
all."62 Second, the Court explained that recent efforts by Congress to
promote the fairness of courts-martial, efforts that to some degree
had moved the system of military justice closer to the civilian system,
sufficed to provide due process.63
In deciding this case, the Supreme Court once again has cast
courts-martial as institutions exercising something other than "the ju-
dicial Power." The Constitution requires neither that military judges
receive separate appointments nor that they receive a fixed term of
tenure. For all that appears, the Constitution does not require that
courts-martial include judges at all. These conclusions follow from
the proposition that courts-martial are instruments of discipline, in-
house-almost advisory-committees to determine how the armed
forces should take care of their own. They are to be just in applying
law to fact. They are attended by dignity and formality. Yet, ulti-
mately, they are not established to do justice between suitors.6
62 Id. at 179.
See id. at 179-81 (noting provisions of the Uniform Code of MilitaryJustice that
"sufficiently preserve judicial impartiality so as to satisfy the Due Process Clause").
The Weiss Court noted a question not at issue in the case but pertinent to the
argument of this Article. The highest military court is the Court of Military Appeals, a
court "of five civilian judges who are appointed by the President, with the advice and
consent of the Senate, for fixed terms of 15 years." iL at 169. The tenure of its
judges-a matter the Court remarked was not at issue in the case before it-would
suggest that Congress considered it to be an Article I, not an Article III, court. Never-
theless, the Military Justice Act of 1983 allows review by the United States Supreme
Court on a writ of certiorari to the Court of Military Appeals. 28 U.S.C. § 1259 (1994);
see also Bennett Boskey & Eugene Grossman, The Supreme Court's New Certiorari Jurisdic-
tion over Militaty Appeals, 102 F.R.D. 329, 331 (1985) (listing the types of cases in which
the Supreme Court may review the decisions of the Court of Military Appeals). If the
Court of Military Appeals is an Article I court by analogy to courts-martial, it is an Arti-
cle I court because it exercises no part of the judicial power as that concept is em-
braced by Article III. But, if so, how may the Supreme Court review that court's deci-
sions? Such power is not within the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. See U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2. Perhaps it also is not within the Supreme Court's appellate juris-
diction if the Court of Military Appeals, for lack of the judicial power, is incapable of
conducting proceedings that truly are judicial. Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 175 (1803) ("It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it
revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted.... .").
UNBALANC17NG ARTICLE III
The Fifth and Sixth Amendments reflect the understanding that
courts-martial do not exercise the judicial power. The Fifth Amend-
ment begins, "[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of
a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces."5
This text seems designed to exclude matters before courts-martial
from the requirements of this clause, at least.6 The Sixth Amend-
ment mentions no such exception, but instead begins, "[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial."67 Yet the Court has rightly concluded that the Sixth
Amendment, like the presentment clause of the Fifth Amendment,
does not apply to military tribunals."3 The Sixth Amendment there-
fore suggests that proceedings in courts-martial are not "criminal
prosecutions"; indeed, they are not.69 Soldiers are "held to answer"
for breaches of discipline before courts-martial, but are not thereby
the subjects of "criminal prosecutions." They are, rather, subjects of
executive discipline.
Courts-martial are not "exceptions" to Article 111.7' Nor is placing
them outside the Article an act of nominalism or legerdemain. How-
ever disinterested and fair, courts-martial are instruments of military
discipline, not instruments of adjudication by a neutral institution.
"The judicial Power" vested by Article III embraces the latter, but not
the former. The benefits of Section 1 security, even if helpful for this
executive function, might be bought too dearly if military officers had
to be invested with it before they could judge in a court-martial.
65 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
SeeUnited States exreL Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 14 n.5 (1955) (noting that
the Fifth Amendment "makes clear that there need be no indictment for such military
offenses as Congress can authorize military tribunals to try"). The Court has stated,
however, that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment does apply to courts-
martial. See Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 43 (1976) (stating that a party due to
appear before a court martial is entitled to the Fifth Amendment guarantee of due
process of law).
67 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
6s SeeExparteMilligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 123-24 (1866) (observing that the Sixth
Amendment applies only "to those persons who were subject to indictment or pre-
sentment" in the fifth Amendment).
69 The Middendorf Court held that a summary court-martial was not a "criminal
prosecution" within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment. See 425 U.S. at 33-42.
70 But see Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50,
71-72 (1982) (plurality opinion) (suggesting that courts-martial are an exception).
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B. Public Rights and the Judicial Power
The public-rights doctrine derives from applying the above prin-
ciple to other executive agencies, which, like courts-martial, may
make decisions without exercising the judicial power. This doctrine
permits executive agents without Section 1 security to decide certain
disputes between private parties and the federal government, disputes
embracing claims either of private parties against the government, or
of the government against private parties]' One would hope that all
executive agencies-obliged, at least indirectly, to "take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed"7-would apply the law to facts in per-
forming their duties. Yet here too, the end of applying law to facts is
not authoritatively to pronounce the law in resolving disputes be-
tween others. It is to perform the duties of administration and execu-
don. Deciding whom to prosecute, what taxes to assess, what grants
to disburse, which veterans qualify for benefits-these, and perhaps
most, decisions of the executive require applying the law to facts.
They are not, however, instances of "the judicial Power."7
Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.,74 the fountain-
head of the public-rights doctrine, explains as much. That case tested
title to lands once held by an absconding collector of customs. One
party claimed that title had passed under a distress warrant issued by a
treasury department official. The other party claimed that the war-
rant took property without due process because an executive officer
could not perform the judicial act of issuing the warrant. Both Article
III and the Fifth Amendment, this party asserted, required that such a
71 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, § 4.4, at 219-20 (discussing the ability of legisla-
tive courts to hear public-rights cases).
V_ U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 3.
Professor Bator asserts that these are exercises of the judicial power, an assess-
ment that leads him to argue that the judicial power is not categorically different from
the executive power. See Bator, supra note 17, at 264-65 (finding an overlap of execu-
tive, judicial, and legislative powers). The following assessment should be enough to
defeat his analysis. The Constitution indicates that the executive and the judicial
powers are distinct. Compare U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 ("The executive Power shall be
vested in a President of the United States of America."), with U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1
("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.").
One's understanding of these powers ought to reflect at least this much. The under-
standing that does reflect this distinction realizes that it is not only the act of applying
law to facts that constitutes the judicial power, but also the context and purpose of that
act. See supra text accompanying notes 37-42.
74 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).
UNBALANCING ARTICLE HI1
warrant issue from a court of law. And if the matter were not one for
the judicial power, how could a court be hearing the case?75
The Court replied:
That the auditing of the accounts of a receiver of public moneys may be,
in an enlarged sense, a judicial act, must be admitted. So are all those
administrative duties the performance of which involves an inquiry into
the existence of facts and the application to them of rules of law. In this
sense the act of the President in calling out the militia under the act of
1795, or of a commissioner who makes a certificate for the extradition of
a criminal, under a treaty, is judicial. But it is not sufficient to bring
such matters under the judicial power, that they involve the exercise of
judgment upon law and fact. It is necessary to go further, and show not
only that the adjustment of the balances due from accounting officers
may be, but from their nature must be, controversies to which the
United States is a party, within the meaning of the second section of the
third article of the constitution. We do not doubt the power of congress
to provide by law that such a question shall form the subject-matter of a
suit in which the judicial power can be exerted. The act of 1820 makes
such a provision for reviewing the decision of the accounting officers of
the treasury. But, until reviewed, it is final and binding, and the ques-
tion is, whether its subject-matter is necessarily, and without regard to
the consent of congress, ajudicial controversy. And we are of opinion it
is not.76
The Court explained that, just as a private creditor has at its disposal
means of self-help, so too does the federal government. Long-
standing English, state, and federal practice recognized the right of
the executive to gather sums owing from a tax collector, even by seiz-
ing his property or person. Although Congress may provide for judi-
cial remedies to test such seizures, the nature of the distress warrant
in Murray's Lessee was executive. The warrant's purpose was not to
award property to one of two parties contesting rights before a tribu-
nal. It was to manage federal tax revenue. Only if Congress submit-
ted the executive to the federal courts to test the warrant would the
judicial power obtain, for then a tribunal would indeed be called
upon to pronounce the law in order to resolve a dispute between two
contestants."
7. See id. at 282 (noting that a party's "argument is, that if this were not, in its na-
ture, a judicial controversy, congress could not have conferred on the district court
power to determine it upon a bill filed by the collector").
76 Id. at 280-81 (citations omitted).
77 See id. at 281-85. Although easily satisfying the Court's new balancing test, the
regimes tested in Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985),
and Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986), bear no rela-
tion to that considered in Murray's Lessee nor do they satisfy the public-rights test im-
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Some have found an anomaly in the public-rights doctrine.78 The
public-rights doctrine, they hold, allows the federal government to
decide nearly all claims between it and private parties without involv-
ing a judge with Section 1 security. But, of all matters in which sepa-
ration of powers and judicial independence seem most compelling,
they suggest, the public-rights area seems most crucial. There the
government interest and temptation to influence decisionmakers
seem the greatest. There an independent judiciary seems at its most
valuable in protecting private parties. (And, they ask on the other
hand, why have criminal matters not been included within the cate-
gory? Simply ad hoc, for tradition's sake? Certainly they appear to
embrace preeminent public rights, claims the government brings
against private parties.)
Ironically, this generalization of the public-rights doctrine, a gen-
eralization intended to show its weaknesses and dangers, eases the
Court's way into a balancing test. The anomaly becomes the para-
digm. The public-rights doctrine has come to stand for the proposi-
tion that the greater the government's interest, the greater Congress's
liberty to assign cases to officials without Section 1 security. Thus, the
public-rights doctrine is taken to be not a formalistic, categor-
ical "exception" to Article III, but rather a continuum along which Ar-
ticle I values weigh in against those of Article I1. 9
All this misses the point: The public-rights doctrine invites no
such anomalous generalization. What makes a matter one of public
rights is not the degree of government interest, but whether the right
is one that falls to the executive to determine as a matter of public
administration, at least for the time being. Using a test that weighs
plicit in the term "the judicial Power," the only textually based test they have any
chance of satisfying. Each involved a right as between private parties, the right to
compensation for research data, see Thomas, 473 U.S. at 571, and the right to recover
on a debt, see Schor, 478 U.S. at 837-38. How a high degree of intimacy of a right with a
federal regulatory scheme, see Thomas, 473 U.S. at 593-94, 600-01 (Brennan,J., concur-
ring), or "necessity," see Schor, 478 U.S. at 843-44, or waiver, see id. at 848-49, authorizes
a degarture from the Constitution remains a mystery of the balance.
See, e.g., Redish, supra note 24, at 210 (discussing the potential constitutional
flaws inherent in the public-rights doctrine); Young, supra note 1, at 837 (criticizing
the public-rights doctrine and its encroachment on separation-of-powers logic); see also
Kenneth S. Klein, The Validity of the Public Rights Doctrine in Light of the Historical Ration-
ale of the Seventh Amendment, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1013 (1994) (arguing against
the constitutional validity of the public-rights doctrine).
79 At least one commentator saw this possibility two decades before Thomas and
Schor. See LOUIs L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 90 (1965)
("'Public right' is an alchemical concept which with a little legerdemain can be used to
transmute nearly any controversy into 'one involving public rights.'").
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the importance of the government interest would suggest that crimi-
nal law should be subject to the public-rights doctrine, because pun-
ishing a criminal with twenty years in prison is more important than
collecting a hundred dollars of internal revenue. A criminal trial,
however, pits the government against the defendant before a disin-
terested tribunal. The prosecution and defense stand before the
court much as do the parties to a civil action. The court authorita-
tively speaks the law, not to guide the executive, but to resolve a dis-
pute between parties at equal distance from itself. Collecting taxes,
on the other hand, is an executive act which, although it requires the
application of law to facts, remains an act of administration. This is
true whether or not the tax officials wear black robes, sit on a bench,
and are called judges of a court,80 because the nature and purpose of
their business is to inform taxpayers of their bills. Before a federal
court, the very same matter takes on a different nature. Instead of "in
house" officials-however unbiased and fair-fine-tuning a tax as-
sessment in a "legislative" court, in federal court the matter becomes
a dispute between two parties submitting to a tribunal that will pro-
nounce the law to resolve their dispute. 81 The public-rights doctrine
teaches simply that until brought before the judicial power, matters
may remain the subject of administration, of the executive applica-
tion of law to facts.
Two concurring opinions by Justice Scalia reflect this understand-
ing of the judicial power and the public-rights doctrine. He wrote the
first in Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, in which the Court decided
that the Seventh Amendment secures the right to trial by jury for
fraudulent-conveyance actions tried in Bankruptcy Court.82 In so de-
ciding, the Court held that such an action vindicates a private, not a
public, right, because the reach of the Seventh Amendment and Arti-
cle III are subject congruently to the force of the public-rights doc-
80 But see Geier, supra note 16, at 994 (arguing that "[t]he Tax Court exercises only
judicial power").81 This is a subtle, but not fatuous, distinction: Federal administrators may, for ex-
ample, resolve back-pay disputes with employees of their agencies. They may study
regulations, marshal facts, and allow employees and supervisors to submit evidence
and argue issues. They may even don robes and sit behind large desks. They may call
their decisions "orders." They may, in fact, mimic federal courts to a great extent.
Nevertheless, all the while they will be performing an executive function-
determining for a federal employer the amount of a paycheck. That the judicial
power might also determine the amount of a paycheck under the appropriate circum-
stances does not gainsay this observation.
82 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
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trine. The Court purported to use Justice Brennan's version of the
Thomas test, a test that eschews the position that ""'a matter of public
rights must at a minimum arise between the government and oth-
ers, ' ' ' 83 and instead asks whether "'Congress, acting for a valid legisla-
tive purpose pursuant to its constitutional powers under Article I,
[has] create [d] a seemingly 'private' right that is so closely integrated
into a public regulatory scheme as to be a matter appropriate for
agency resolution with limited involvement by the Article III judici-
ary.' 84 The Nordberg Court held the fraudulent-conveyance action
private, more a common-law suit than an integral part of restructur-
ing debtor-creditor relations.
Justice Scalia could not agree that the public-rights doctrine
reached cases to which the federal government was not a party. In-
stead, he argued, public rights extended only to claims "brought by or
against the United States. "85 He saw the doctrine as rooted in the
doctrine of sovereign immunity: The Framers of the Constitution, he
believed, contemplated "a discrete category of judicial acts" that, be-
cause they involved the government as a party, "were not thought to
implicate a 'judicial controversy.' 86 That is, the government could
resolve claims brought by it or against it without the need to make a
federal case out of everything.
Justice Scalia further explained his views in a later concurrence,
this one joined by three other Justices. Freytag v. Commissioner posed
the question whether the chief judge of the Tax Court constitution-
ally could appoint a special trial judge.87 To do so, the chief judge
must either act for a "'Court[] of Law"' or be the "'Head[] of [a] De-
partment[].'"8 The Court answered that the chief judge of the Tax
Court could indeed appoint the special trial judge, because the Tax
Court was a court of law "exercis[ing] the judicial power of the
83 Id. at 54 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Mara-
thon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 69 (1982) (plurality opinion) (quotingExparte Bake-
lite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451 (1929))).
84 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring) (alterations in original) (quoting Thomas v. Union
Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 593-94 (1985)).
Id. at 68 (ScaliaJ., concurring).
Id. at 69 (Scalia,J., concurring).
87 501 U.S. 868 (1991).
88 Id at 878, 884 (quoting U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cI. 2). The Appointments Clause
provides: "[T]he Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers,
as they. think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of
Departments." U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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United States."89 This is so, the Court opined, notwithstanding that
the Tax Court was an Article I, not an Article III, court. Because the
Tax Court acts like a court, deciding cases, examining witnesses, and
applying law to facts, it is a "Court of Law" in the sense of the Ap-
pointments Clause. It could, therefore, through its chief judge, ap-
point a special trial judge.
Justice Scalia opined that the "Courts of Law" mentioned in the
Appointments Clause have to be Article III courts, but that the chief
judge of the Tax Court was a head of a department and, as such,
could appoint a special trial judge.9 For our purposes, most signifi-
cant were his remarks answering the Court's claim that the Article I
Tax Court exercises "the judicial power of the United States"9':
Despite [the] unequivocal text [of Article III], the Court sets forth the
startling proposition that "the judicial power of the United States is not
limited to the judicial power defined under Article III." It turns out,
however-to our relief, I suppose it must be said-that this is really only
a pun. "The judicial power," as the Court uses it, bears no resemblance
to the constitutional term of art we are all familiar with, but means only
"the power to adjudicate in the manner of courts." So used, as I shall
proceed to explain, the phrase covers an infinite variety of individuals
exercising executive rather than judicial power (in the constitutional
sense), and has nothing to do with the separation of powers or with any
other characteristic that might cause one to believe that is what was
meant by "the Courts of Law.
92
Regarding Article I tribunals, " [i] t is no doubt true that all such bod-
ies 'adjudicate,' i.e., they determine facts, apply a rule of law to those
facts, and thus arrive at a decision. But there is nothing 'inherently
judicial' about 'adjudication.' 9 3 It is rather "the identity of the offi-
cer-not something intrinsic about the mode of decisionmaking or
type of decision-that tells us whether the judicial power is being ex-
ercised."94 The Tax Court calculates taxpayers' bills, an executive
89 Freytag, 501 U.S. at 889.
90 See id. at 901 (Scalia,J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
91 IM. at 890.
92 Id. at 908 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (quoting
Freytag, 501 U.S. at 889).
Id. at 909 (ScaliaJ., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
Id. at 911 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). The
FreytagCourt relied in part upon dicta from Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 565
(1933), that suggested that legislative courts "are invested with judicial power." See
Freytag, 501 U.S. at 889-91. Justice Scalia's concurrence disposes of the dicta, noting
the condemnation Williams has received from commentators. See Freytag, 501 U.S. at
913 n.5 (ScaliaJ., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
1998] 1065
1066 UN!VERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 146:1043
function, no matter the judicial "accouterments."95 In the forceful
formalism typical ofJustice Scalia,96 the opinion demonstrates that the
public-rights doctrine is rooted in the text of the Constitution, not in
a pragmatic exception to the text. The term "the judicial Power" it-
self speaks to the context of applying law to fact. Not all adjudications
involve the judicial power. To adjudicate public rights within execu-
tive agencies is not to exercise the judicial power.
A proper distinction between the judicial power and the executive
power shows that the Constitution does not call for judges with Sec-
tion 1 security in the categories of courts-martial and public-rights ac-
tions. Decisions within these two categories fall to executive officers
whose tenure and compensation are left by the Constitution to politi-
cal and prudential determinations. The categories are not exceptions
to the text of Article III, for the text does not purport to embrace
them.
III. TERRITORIAL COURTS AND THEJUDICIAL POWER
"OF THE UNITED STATES"
In American Insurance Co. v. Canter,97 the Court upheld a tribunal
authorized by act of Congress for the territory of Florida.98 Its judges
enjoyed a tenure of only four years. But Chief Justice John Marshall
explained that, because the Superior Courts of Florida were
"legislative," not "constitutional," courts, their judges need not have
Section 1 security.9 True, the courts were "incapable of receiving"
95 See Freytag 501 U.S. at 912 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgnent).
See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 239-40 (1995) (Scalia, J.)
(stating that separation of powers "establish[es] high walls and clear distinc-
tions .... Good fences make good neighbors."); Granfinanciera, S.A v. Nordberg, 492
U.S. 33, 70 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(criticizing Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986), and stat-
ing that separation of powers "must be anchored in rules, not set adrift in some multi-
factored 'balancing test'"); Scalia, supra note 33, at 1185 ("I believe that the establish-
ment of broadly applicable general principles is an essential component of the judicial
process ... ."). For an in-depth study ofJustice Scalia's rule-based formalism, see Eric
J. Segall,Justice Scalia, Critical Legal Studies, and the Rule of Law, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
991, 1005 (1994).
97 26 U.S. 511, 1 Pet. 388 (1828).
98 Congress vested "the whole judicial power of the territory 'in two Superior
Courts, and in such inferior Courts, and justices of the peace, as the legislative council
of the territory may from time to time establish.'" 26 U.S. at 543, 1 Pet. at 413. The
territorial legislature thereafter constituted the tribunal whose act was at issue. See id.
Id. at 545-46, 1 Pet. at 413-14.
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the judicial power of the United States.0 Nevertheless, the Superior
Courts' exercise of the admiralty jurisdiction vested in them by Con-
gress did not violate Article III.10' These courts were creatures of Arti-
cle I, and their existence and operation had nothing whatsoever to do
with Article III.
So begins, it is said, the hoary tradition of exceptions to the text
of Article III.1 Congress authorized the establishment of the Florida
territorial courts. Congress invested them with jurisdiction, including
admiralty jurisdiction. But because Congress has "plenary power"
over territorial government, somehow Article III presents no prob-
lem. In fact, as the argument runs, Canter must be carving an excep-
tion out of the text of Article III; otherwise, the Canter Court itself
never could have heard the case: The matter either was or was not
within the judicial power of the United States.'03 If it was, the Florida
courts must have exercised the judicial power of the United States,
notwithstanding Chief Justice Marshall's rhetoric, and so the Chief
Justice created an exception to Article III. If the matter was not
within the judicial power of the United States, the federal courts, in-
cluding the Supreme Court, should have dismissed Canter for want of
subject matter jurisdiction. So, the argument concludes, Canter must
be understood to hold that Article III-despite its text and obvious
applicability to territorial courts-somehow does not constrain Con-
gress's establishment of territorial courts.14 Article III has undergone
judicial amendment
Wrong. Article III was not amended in Canter or in any of the
other cases that find no constitutional impediment to congressional
statutes establishing courts for the territories or the District of Co-
lumbia.1'0 The courts that Congress establishes for such polities un-
der its control are not truly United States courts. They, like state
100 Id.
1 See id.
102 See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 1, at 921-26 (discussing cases that are incompatible
with Article III literalism).
103 See Canter, 26 U.S. 511, 1 Pet. 388.
104 See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 106-
07 (1982) (White, J., dissenting) (drawing the above conclusions from Canter); Glid-
den Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 544-47 (1962) (plurality opinion) (discussing Canter
and concluding that "practical considerations" led Chief Justice Marshall to
"recognize[] a greater flexibility in Congress to deal with problems arising outside the
normal context of a federal system").
105 See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 400-01 (1973) (discussing Congress's
authority to create territorial courts).
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courts, are courts of their respective polities.10 6 The polity of territo-
rial Florida had its courts, as does the State of Florida today. Yet,
whereas today the State of Florida provides courts for itself, Congress
provided courts for territorial Florida. 0 7 That the decisions of these
courts could be reviewed by the United States Supreme Court, as in
Canter, did not negate the fact that the Florida territorial court was,
with Congress's authority, exercising the judicial power of the terri-
tory, a polity other than the United States, when deciding a case in
admiralty.'08 Similarly, state courts exercise state judicial power over
cases, even though the federal judicial power also "extends" to them'o
and will be exercised if they are reviewed in the United States Su-
preme Court."° Even when state courts decide types of cases and con-
troversies that are listed in the Constitution as within the judicial
power of the United States, cases and controversies for which review
may lie in the United States Supreme Court,"' the judicial power
112these state courts exercise is their own. So it is with territorial
courts."13
106 See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 154 (1878) (noting that the territo-
rial courts may have the same jurisdiction as circuit and district courts but are not
"circuit or district courts of the United States"); Hornbuckle v. Toombs, 85 U.S. (18
Wall.) 648, 656 (1873) ("[T]he jurisdiction of the Territorial courts is collectively co-
extensive with and correspondent to that of the State courts."); Clinton v.
Englebrecht, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 434, 447 (1871) ("Thejudges of [the territorial court]
are appointed by the President under the act of Congress, but this does not make the
courts.., courts of the United States."); Benner v. Porter, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 235, 244
(1850) ("The Territorial courts ... were not courts in which the judicial power con-
ferred by the Constitution on the Federal government could be deposited.").
107 See U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 3, cI. 2.
108 Section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 76, made federal admi-
ralty jurisdiction exclusive of state admiralty jurisdiction. See Romero v. International
Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 359-80 (1959) (detailing the development of
state and federal admiraltyjurisdiction). Nothing in this provision, however, is incon-
sistent with an act of Congress that invests a territorial court with admiralty jurisdic-
tion. See The "City of Panama", 101 U.S. 453, 458-59 (1879) (holding, as in Canter it-
self, that the territorial court, unlike a state court, hadjurisdiction of admiralty cases).
109 See Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. 1, 27-28, 5 Wheat. 1, 13 (1820) ("[T]he state
courts may exercise jurisdiction on cases authorized by the laws of the state, and not
prohibited by the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal Courts.").
110 See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 338, 1 Wheat. 141, 156 (discussing
the extension of federal appellatejurisdiction to state tribunals).
III See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
112 See THE FEDERALIST No. 82, at 493 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (opining that state courts have jurisdiction over every case not "excluded by the
future acts of the national legislature").
11 SeeFreytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 913 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment) (stating that territorial courts "are neither Article
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Again, as with courts-martial and public rights, the analysis to be
used is that given by the Court itself in the leading case. In Canter,
Chief Justice Marshall did not emphasize the plenary power of Con-
gress over territories, as if such a power were so great as to license
Congress to trample Article III. Instead, he distinguished between
two types of congressional legislation for two distinct polities:
The jurisdiction with which [the Florida territorial courts] are invested,
is not a part of that judicial power which is defined in the 3d article of
the Constitution, but is conferred by Congress, in the execution of those
general powers which that body possesses over the territories of the
United States. Although admiralty jurisdiction can be exercised in the
states, in those Courts only, which, are established in pursuance of the
third article of the constitution; the same limitation does not extend to
the territories. In legislating for them, Congress exercises the combined
powers of the general, and of a state government.14
Territorial courts (and the courts of the District of Columbia) exer-
cise the judicial power of their respective polities. Though crea-
tions of Congress, these courts fall outside the terms of Article III, be-
cause they do not exercise the judicial power of the United States.
Theirjudges need not enjoy Section 1 security.
This constitutional distinction between territorial Article I legisla-
tive courts and Article III courts is sound. Article III ensures that state
courts will not be supplanted by a federal judiciary that is subservient
to the President or to Congress. Federal politics are to be confined to
the two political branches. Whatever tenure each state might pre-
scribe for its own judges, it is protected from improper federal in-
fluence upon litigation involving its citizens in that the judges of
courts invested with the judicial power of the United States are to
III courts nor Article I courts, but Article IV courts-just as territorial governors are
not Article I executives but Article IV executives").
114 American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. 511, 546, 1 Pet. 388, 415 (1828);see also
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 849, at
605-06 (Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak eds., Carolina Academic Press 1987)
(1833) (describing the courts of the territories of the United States as legislative rather
than Article III courts). As to the exclusive nature of admiralty jurisdiction, see supra
note 108.
115 See supra note 98.
6 Federal judges have life tenure, whereas judges in forty-six of the fifty states
face some form of electoral review." Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a
Role for the FederalJudicia, 36 UCLA L. REV. 233, 275-76 (1988); see Edward Hartnett,
Why Is the Supreme Court of the United States Protecting State Judges from Popular Democracy?,
75 TEX. L. REV. 907, 975 (1997) (explaining that "[o]nly three states ... give judges
what some call life tenure").
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have Section 1 security.1 7 But, when "the People," through the Con-
stitution, entrusted Congress with authority to act in the manner of a
local legislature with respect to territories or the District of Colum-
bia, 8 they intended Congress to establish courts as Congress deems
best, without regard to Article III. In such cases, Congress has as
much liberty in shaping ajudiciary for a polity as a state does in shap-
ing its own courts. Federalism does not have the same sway as it does
for federal courts within the states, courts that exercise the judicial
power of the United States."9 Congress, like a state legislature, might
invest judges of territorial courts with good-behavior tenure; then
again, like almost all state legislatures, it might not. 
2
1
As with courts-martial and executive agencies acting to determine
matters of public rights, territorial legislative courts exist not by virtue
of an exception to Article III, adopted by prescription, despite the
text of the Article. To the contrary, territorial legislative courts exist
because the text of Article III does not reach them. Though estab-
lished by the United States Congress, they do not exercise the judicial
power of the United States.
IV. ADJUNCTS, "JUDGES," AND "COURTS"
In the 1932 maritime case of Crowell v. Benson, '2 the Supreme
Court held that a deputy commissioner of a federal administrative
agency-though lacking Section 1 security--could lawfully award an
117 SeeTHE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 3 (discussing how good-behavior tenure
forjudges will protect the public).
11 See U.S. CONSr. art. IV, § 3 ("The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property be-
longing to the United States .. .. "); id art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (giving Congress the power
"[t]o exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District... as
may... become the Seat of the Government of the United States"); Palmore v. United
States, 411 U.S. 389, 397-99, 402-04 (1973) (discussing congressional authority under
Articles I and III to enact laws for and vestjurisdiction in the District of Columbia, the
states, and the territories).
11 And "the need forjudicial independence from Congress in the administration
of local District [of Columbia] law is arguably less than the need for independence
that exists when national laws are being administered." Ralph U. Whitten, Consent,
Caseload, and OtherJustifications for Non-Article III Courts and Judges: A Comment on Com-
modities Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, 20 CREIGHTON L. REv. 11, 19 (1986).
Congress may not be as inclined to interfere in such cases. See id. ("Members of Con-
gress ... probably do not care as much about the administration of local justice in the
District [of Columbia] ... and this lessens the likelihood that they will intervene to
pressure District of Columbiajudges to reach particular results.").
120 See supra note 116.
121 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
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injured employee compensation against his private employer under
the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.'
22
Federal courts were available to enforce, modify, suspend, or set aside
such awards. The Crowell Court agreed that legislation providing for
such awards did not violate Article 11. '2 When courts divide their
work between judges and other judicial officers, Article III requires
only that an arrangement "maintain the essential attributes
of... judicial power.' 24  "Other judicial officers" come in various
forms. Common-law courts use juries. Equity and admiralty courts
use "masters, and commissioners or assessors."' Likewise, the Crowell
Court held, Congress may assign factfinding powers to administrative
agencies, reserving to federal courts the determination of questions of
law.
Crowell began what is called the "adjunct" exception to Article
III. 26 As long as adjunct decisionmakers exercise no "essential attrib-
utes of the judicial power,"2 1 this exception permits them to exercise
"some" of the judicial power.1 28 Congress is also said to have more
ability to vest the judicial power in adjunct decisionmakers when it
creates the rights at issue.129 The fewer powers of a court an agency
12 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1994).
123 See Crowel 285 U.S. at 49-50. A majority of the Court reasoned that the award
involved the deputy commissioner in no factfinding that would bind a federal court as
to constitutional orjurisdictional issues. The federal court reviewing the validity of the
award would be free to find "fundamental or jurisdictional facts" for itself. Id. at 62.
Justice Brandeis, with two others, dissented, writing that Article III offered no im-
pediment whatever to administrative adjudication. See id. at 86-88 (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting).
Later cases seem to have jettisoned the majority's quibbles regarding constitu-
tional and jurisdictional facts. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 82 n.34 (1982) (plurality opinion) (citing St. Joseph Stock Yards
Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 53 (1936)). But see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, § 4.4,
at 226 ("In general, Crowell remains good law in that [constitutional] facts may be reli-
tigated, de novo, in an Article III federal court." (footnote omitted)).
124 Crowell 285 U.S. at 51.
125 Id.
126 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, § 4.4, at 225-27 (discussing Crowell and the
"adjunct" theory).
127 Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 77 (plurality opinion) (citing Crowell 285 U.S. at
51).
128 Id. at 78-79, 81, 87 (plurality opinion); see id. at 87-89 (plurality opinion)
(holding that the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 "has impermissibly removed most, if not all,
of 'the essential attributes of thejudicial power' from the Art. III district court, and has
vested those attributes in a non-Art. III adjunct" (quoting the Bankruptcy Reform Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1471 (1994))).
129 See id. at 80 (plurality opinion) ("[lit is clear that when Congress creates a sub-
stantive federal right, it possesses substantial discretion to prescribe the manner in
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possesses, the more likely it is to be viewed as an "adjunct" to the fed-
eral courts, and therefore an acceptable exception to the Article III
regime.' s°
The "adjunct" theory, in fact, works no exception to 
Article III.131
While the Crowell opinion lacks a clear statement of how the text of
Article III supports the adjunct theory, Article III is, in itself, rather
clear. The text of Article III never vests 'the judicial Power" of the
United States in judges, let alone judges with Section 1 security. The
judicial power is vested in courts, the judges of which shall have the
required security.
The arrangement, then, is not one of judicial power shared be-
tween a federal court and another agency, where the "essential attrib-
utes" of power inhere in the former but not the latter. 3  All of the
judicial power must vest in the court. 34 What is at issue is which du-
ties render a decisionmaker a 'Judge" for purposes of Article III,
thereby requiring that individual to possess Section 1 security. Offi-
which that right may be adjudicated-including the assignment to an adjunct of some
functions historically performed byjudges.").
130 See id. at 87 (plurality opinion) (stating that a grant of court-like power to an
adjunct cannot be sustained).
131 See Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037, 1045-54 (7th Cir.
1984) (Posner,J., dissenting) (discussing and applying an adjunct theory rooted in the
text of Article III).
132 This fact has occasionally gone unnoticed in discussions of Article III. See, e.g.,
Redish, supra note 24, at 226 ("Article III vests the 'judicial power' in judges...."). Or
if noticed, the importance of this fact has been minimized. See Linda J. Silberman,
Master and Magistrates Part 1: The American Analogue, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1297, 1300-04
(1975) (acknowledging that "no provision of the Constitution inextricably links the
exercise of power with the article III judge," but nonetheless stating that courts exer-
cise thejudicial power "through article Iijudges").
133 In cases before Crowell, the Supreme Court did not protest the use of special
masters or auditors by federal judges. In one instance, the Court even held that a
judge should have been more deferential to a special master's findings. See Kimberly
v. Arms, 129 U.S. 512, 524 (1889) ("In practice it is not usual for the court to reject the
report of a master, with his findings upon the matter referred to him ... ."). Courts, it
stated in another case, have "inherent power" that "includes authority to appoint per-
sons unconnected with the court to aid judges in the performance of specific judicial
duties." Exparte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312 (1920).
Black's Law Dictionary gives this as part of its definition of "Court":
An organized body with defined powers, meeting at certain times and places
for the hearing and decision of causes and other matters brought before it,
and aided in this, its proper business, by its proper officers, viz., attorneys and
counsel to present and manage the business, clerks to record and attest its
acts and decisions, and ministerial officers to execute its commands, and se-
cure due order in its proceedings.
BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 41, at 352. Based on this definition alone, a
court is clearly more than itsjudges.
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cials of the executive branch may act as officers of federal courts, as
"adjuncts," without violating Article III.35 They become, for constitu-
tional purposes, court personnel. But only court personnel with Sec-
tion 1 security serve as "judges."
136
The question remains how to determine what duties render a de-
cisionmaker a 'Judge" in the constitutional sense. As with "the judi-
cial Power," so with "judges" one must decode this term with refer-
ence to the common usage of 1789.137 The line between judge and
adjunct-between judge and jury, special master, commissioner, as-
sessor, or other nonjudge personnel of the court-is drawn by Article
III. If an administrative regime respects this line, it does not violate
Article 111.139 As long as "judges" with Section 1 security perform all
"judging," Article III leaves Congress free to constitute courts with
subalterns as it sees fit,1 40 possibly even filling courts with agents of the
executive.14
135 Whether doing so breaches some other provision of the Constitution, such as
the Appointments Clause, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, is not addressed here.
13 The distinction between ajudge and his court would have been well known to
the Framers. Judges of the English common-law courts by themselves at home or in
chambers could enter orders on minor matters. By the late-18th century, such orders,
though binding if accepted by the parties, were nevertheless not considered orders of
the court. For the court to enforce the order, it must first have been made an order of
the court and not just of a judge of the court. See A.S. Diamond, The Queen's Bench
Master, 76 LAW Q. REV. 504, 504-06, 506 (1960) ("[T]hejudge's order was not an order
of the court. [One] would first need to apply to the court to make the judge's order a
rule of court.. .."). A 1782 case raising the question whether published criticisms of
an action Lord ChiefJustice Mansfield took sitting in chambers could be contempt of
court may have caught the eye of a Framer or two. See id. at 506.
137 See supra note 39.
133 See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127-28 n.6 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(noting the level-of-generality question inherent in analyzing historical or traditional
meanings). This question presents itself in distinguishing betweenjudge and adjunct:
does the distinction follow the specific offices of 1789 practice or instead the principle
that animated the practice? Probably most faithful to the text, using as it does only the
word "judge" to circumscribe in composite the diverse roles of adjuncts, is the ap-
proach that looks to practices and offices contemporaneous with the adoption of the
text to establish a general definition of the word "judge" as distinguished from ad-
junct. That is the approach taken in this Article. Furthermore, such a general defini-
tion reflects a principled distinction that accords with the textual provision of Section
1 security forjudges only. See infra text accompanying notes 142-50.
139 The term "line" is not intended to suggest solely a bifurcation of duties without
reference to the relationship to be maintained between judges and adjuncts. The
"line" might be crossed when judges insufficiently supervise or manage adjuncts.
14 See Laura B. Bartell, Contempt of the Bankruptcy Court--A New Look 1996 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1, 27 (characterizing bankruptcy judges as "administrative functionaries, wearing
black robes and bearing an exalted title").
141 But see supra note 135.
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Perhaps the history of chancery provides the most help in defin-
ing the traditional division between judges and nonjudge officials
within a court.1 42 Although the matter is in some dispute, it seems
that the masters in chancery, who aided the Chancellor, were seen in
the eighteenth century as adjuncts of the court and not as judges:
"[T]he... Masters in Chancery, have exercis'd, and at this day do exer-
cise judicial authority in the court of Chancery: But it is one thing to
exercise judicial authority in a court, and another thing to be ajudge of
that court, every officer of a court who assists and helps the Judge in the
exercise of judgment, so far as such assistance goes, does a judicial act,
but yet he is not thereby the Judge. He that is the Judge of a court,
must be the supreme, and final determiner of matters within the same
court, and must be able to judge of all matters within the jurisdiction of
the court, and must likewise have power to execute and make effectual
all hisjudgments and decrees."143
Adjuncts and judges both exercise the judicial authority of a court,
but the judge, not the adjunct, ultimately decides and effects the
judgment. It seems that eighteenth-century America transplanted the
office of master in chancery, along with, to some degree, the distinc-
tion between adjunct andjudge.144 In addition to the office of master
in chancery, the office of commissioner would also have been familiar
to the framers of Article III. Commissioners took depositions to
gather facts in chancery cases. 45  Since 1793, officers (named
"commissioners" in 1812) have assisted United States courts in the ad-
judication of criminal matters. This English and early American
142 See generally 1 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 416-21 (A.L.
Goodheart & H.G. Hanbury eds., 7th rev. ed. 1956) (1903) (discussing the develop-
ment of the office of masters in chancery to provide assistance to the Chancellor).
143 James R. Bryant, The Office of Master in Chancery: Early English Development 40
A.B.A. J. 498, 501 (1954) (quoting SAMUEL BURROUGHS, THE LEGAL JUDICATURE IN
CHANCERY 56 (London,J. Walthoe 1727)). ChiefJudge Posner, citing Blackstone, un-
derstands that "the Lord Chancellor reviewed the masters' decrees de novo." Geras v.
Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037, 1046 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J., dis-
senting) (citation omitted).
144 See James R. Bryant, The Office of Master in Chancery: Colonial Development, 40
A.B.A. J. 595, 598 (1954) (discussing the transplantation of masters of chancery into
American colonial courts).
145 See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 41, at *449 (discussing the order and method of
depositions in England as compared to that in the 13 colonies).
146 See Richard W. Peterson, The Federal Magistrate Act: A New Dimension in the Imple-
mentation ofJustic4 56 IOWA L. REV. 62, 66-67 (1970) (discussing the powers of commis-
sioners, including "issu[ing] warrants for arrest, commitment, and admittance to
bail"); Joseph F. Spaniol, Jr., The Federal Magistrates Act: History and Development, 1974
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 565, 566-67 (discussing the roles played by magistrates in taking bail in
UNBALANCTNG ARTICLE III
tradition should help distinguish adjuncts from judges.4 7 The text of
Article III embraces this tradition in using as it does the terms of art
"Courts" and "Judges."
As previously shown,4 1 finding a formalist, textual solution to a
constitutional question is not fleeing reason and principle to find a
refuge in words, but rather finding reason and principle expressed in
words. In providing for federal courts, the judges of which are to
have Section 1 security, Article III strikes a balance born of both rea-
son and principle. Protecting judges from political pressures is nec-
essary to prevent tyranny;49 protecting all court officials, however, is
not necessary, and would invite inefficiency and expense. A broader
constitutional protection might even have compromised the authority
ofjudges by limiting their ability to govern their own courts. Giving
judges, but not other court officers, good-behavior tenure had worked
well for the English courts. 50 Article III, with good reason and upon
sound principle, makes a like distinction among court officers.
Like the other "exceptions" this Article has examined-courts-
martial, public-rights cases, and territorial courts-the adjunct excep-
tion is no exception. If the proper constitutional distinction is made
between judges and other officers of the court, the adjunct theory re-
spects the text of Article III.
CONCLUSION
"In considering this question [of the scope of the enumerated
powers], then, we must never forget that it is a constitution we are ex-
criminal cases and describing the background and legislative history of the Federal
Magistrates Act).
,4 The tradition suggests that, at some point, an Article III "judge" must become
involved in a full adjudication employing an "adjunct." See supra note 143 and accom-
panying text. But see Constitutional Analysis, supra note 13, at 291-302 (drawing a con-
trary conclusion from the precedents, including a dozen from the courts of appeals
directly on point). Whether litigants, by waiver or agreement, may elect to permit the
work ofjudges to be performed by adjuncts to the court is also a question to be an-
swered from this tradition. It may be that election has no bearing on the role ofjudge
and adjunct. See Geras, 742 F.2d at 1054 (Posner, J., dissenting) (stating that requiring
parties' consent to trial by magistrate does not make 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) comport with
the purpose, let alone the text, of Article III).
4 See supra text accompanying notes 70, 80-81, and 116-20.
149 See supra note 5.
ISO See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 3, at 465 (praising good-behavior ten-
ure); F.W. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 312-13 (1920)
(discussing the historical role of good-behavior tenure in England).
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pounding."15 1 ChiefJustice John Marshall did not mean that the text
before him invited judicial revision, but rather that it invited an un-
crabbed interpretation faithful to the text. Article III requires the
same faithful interpretation. It has no need of exceptions. The text
of the Constitution permits courts-martial, territorial courts, executive
adjudication of public rights, and the participation of judicial ad-
juncts-all without the protection of Section 1 security.15 Granted,
these institutions and practices must be held to limits absent from the
present balancing test. To conclude that the Constitution allows
them is not to conclude that it allows them necessarily as they appear
today. What the Constitution does is to provide principled guidance,
a rule of law, regarding the incidence of Section 1 security. The
provenance of the so-called "exceptions" to Article III rests upon the
Constitution, not upon an unprincipled departure from the Constitu-
tion under the guise of historical necessity. To adopt a balancing test
is to abandon their rationale, not tojustify it.
151 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407, 4 Wheat. 159, 200 (1819).
152 This reading of the text accords well with Alexander Hamilton's shorthand
summary that "all judges who may be appointed by the United States are to hold their
offices during good behavior," THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 3, at 465. Section 1
security does not run to executive officers, to judges appointed by territorial authori-
ties (even if those authorities happen to be also the President or Congress of the
United States), or to nonjudge officers of courts.
